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Abstract 
This article sheds light on the valuation of family firms compared to non-family firms as 
acquisition targets. We argue that although the majority of theoretical and empirical research 
explicitly recognizes the prevalence and superior performance of family firms around the world, 
acquiring companies tend to regard family firms as unprofessional and inefficient organizations, 
thus negatively affecting their valuation as compared to non-family firm targets. Overall, our 
empirical analysis, based on a matched-pairs methodology and use of multiples, shows that 
acquiring companies favor the stagnation perspective rather than the stewardship perspective and 
thus pay less (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a family firm target than for a non-family firm target. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The increasingly rapid change in the current business environment and the need for novel 
solutions often motivate firms to expand their resources through acquisitions (Makri, Hitt & 
Lane, 2010). Acquisition is a unique form of entrepreneurship activity through which a company 
(acquirer) acquires another company (target) (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 1991). In the 
latter half of the 20th century, acquisitions became a prominent strategy for many companies, 
large and small, to acquire complementary resources. Their strategic use to acquire new 
resources has become a well institutionalized corporate phenomenon, primarily because 
acquisition targets provide opportunities for organizational learning by exposing the acquirer to 
new and diverse ideas, thereby overcoming resource-based constraints to growth (Harrison et al., 
1991; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990). 
However, while acquisition has received considerable research attention in the strategic 
management literature (e.g. Harrison et al., 1991), and although family firms are the most 
common form of organizations throughout the world,  accounting for over 75% of all registered 
companies in most economies (Miller, Steier & Le Breton-Miller, 2003), only few recent studies 
have focused on family firms’ acquisitions (e.g. Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; Holmen 
& Nivorozhkin, 2007; Mickelson & Worley, 2003; Steen & Welch, 2006). A family firm is here 
defined as an organization in which a family has a substantial ownership stake, and has at least 
two of its members in key management positions (see Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & 
Cannella, 2007; Westhead & Cowling, 1998). 
A central issue in any acquisition is the valuation of the target company by the acquirer – 
a procedure to determine the price to be paid for the acquisition (i.e. acquire at a discount or 
premium). Surprisingly, none of the aforementioned family-firm studies compared valuation of 
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privately-held family firm targets with non-family firm targets. Our empirical research attempts 
to fill this gap in the family-firm literature, thus suggesting important implications for research 
and practice. Two major views have been constructed regarding the nature of family firms: 
stewardship vs. stagnation (Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Scholnick, 2008). The stewardship 
perspective suggests that family members view themselves as stewards of the family firm, and 
thus nurture it for the support of future generations through stewardship over the continuity of 
business, employees, and customer relationships. This enables family firms to perform better 
than non-family firms. Alternatively, the stagnation perspective proposes that family 
organizations face unique challenges to growth and expansion mainly because of resource 
restrictions. Miller et al. (2008)’s findings fully substantiate the stewardship perspective but not 
the stagnation perspective (see also Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
Building on the above-arguments, we argue that although most theoretical and empirical 
research explicitly recognizes the prevalence and superior performance of family firms around 
the world (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 2008; Sharma, 2004), acquirers tend to regard 
the family firm as an unprofessional and inefficient organization in which decision-making 
processes are driven by emotions rather than by economic rationality (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, 
Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Salvato, Chirico & Sharma, 2010).  Hence, 
acquirers are disposed to pay a lower price (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a family firm target 
than for a non-family firm target. We believe that a focus on family firms may both advance 
knowledge on the valuation of target firms and help us understand specifically why acquiring 
companies pay a discount price for family firm targets as compared to non-family firm targets.  
The potential insights that can be gained by addressing valuation issues in acquisitions 
from a family perspective result from the unique and distinguished features of family firms when 
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compared to non-family firms. The family firm is indeed the only organization in which family 
members are simultaneously active in the family and the business, hence significantly 
influencing business performance (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon & Very, 2007; Chirico & Salvato, 
2008). Thus, tangible and intangible resources are unique in this type of organization since they 
result from interactions between the family, its individual members, and the business (Sirmon & 
Hitt, 2003). Consequently, when the target company is a family firm whose economic value 
stems not only from the business, but also from the family, evaluating such firm can become 
quite complex. A detailed examination from both the family and business’ aspects is therefore 
required at the time of acquisition. However, acquirers generally tend to focus their attention on 
the negative aspects of a family firm. In their eyes, stagnation drawbacks prevail over 
stewardship advantages, thus underestimating its real value. 
We explore the overlooked topic of valuing family firms within the context of 
acquisition, using a unique dataset of privately-held family and non-family firm targets. Given 
that the valuation of both privately-held family and non-family firms is a difficult and often 
highly subjective process, especially because a privately-held company has no observable stock 
price to serve as an objective measure of market value, we relied on valuations from recent 
acquisitions. We employed a matched-pairs method for statistical analysis, and the standard 
technique of multiples as measures of value (see Alouche, Amann, Jaussaud & Kurashina, 2008; 
Koeplin, Sarin & Shapiro, 2000). We note the absence of multiples in previous family firm 
literature. Accordingly, we offer practical implications for potential family firm targets as well as 
their acquirers. 
This article is organized in the following manner. We first review the literature on 
resource-based logic in acquisitions. We then discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the 
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family firm, and explore how it is perceived by external investors in the acquisition process. 
Accordingly, we develop our hypothesis followed by a description of the methodology. The 
paper ends with the results, discussion, contributions and limitations of the study. Implications 
for research and practice are shared in the concluding section. 
RESOURCE-BASED LOGIC IN ACQUISITIONS 
The resource-based view of the firm is a useful framework for studying the sources of 
value creation (Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007). The essence of resource-based logic rests in an 
emphasis on bundles of unique tangible and intangible resources at the firm’s disposal as the 
foundation for creating value and competitive advantages (Barney, 1991). The common factor 
driving acquisition strategies is that in dynamic markets with increased globalization, it is hard 
for a single firm to possess all resources needed to develop and sustain current competitive 
advantages. Thus, most organizations rely on other organizations to help support growth 
objectives (Harrison et al., 1991). Furthermore, the complexity of modern products and services, 
and the changing consumer demands, increase interdependence among organizations and 
amplify the need to recombine resources (Sirmon et al., 2007). In this instance, no other 
combination of firms can produce the same value, meaning that the synergy is the source of a 
competitive advantage (Makri et al., 2010). Novel resources that a firm cannot create 
independently are thus developed and new markets are entered through acquisitions. 
Accordingly, Hitt et al. (1990) argue that acquisitions may serve as a substitute for innovation. 
For example, firms may acquire target companies with technology different from their own so as 
to acquire new product lines without assuming high risks involved in internal innovation 
(Harrison et al., 1991; Hitt, Harrison & Ireland, 2001). 
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In sum, firms acquire companies characterized by resources that they themselves lack, 
such as management teams with specialized knowledge in a specific area or market. Thus, it 
becomes extremely important to thoroughly evaluate the tangible and intangible resources 
available in the potential target company so as to determine its economic value and the price to 
be paid for its acquisition (see Fernández, 2002; Koeplin et al., 2000). In the next sections, we 
argue that the valuation issue can be specifically complex when the target company is a family 
firm whose economic value stems from both the family and business’ sides (e.g. family 
members’ idiosyncratic knowledge). Accordingly, we first present the family firm as a repository 
of valuable tangible and intangible resources which can be exploited by external investors 
through acquisition strategies (Arregle et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2008; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
Then, we describe how acquirers’ perception of a family firm target may strongly affect their 
valuation compared to a non-family firm target’s valuation. 
THE FAMILY FIRM  
Stewardship vs. Stagnation Perspectives 
That family firms play a dominant and crucial role in today's economy is now well 
documented (Colli, 2003). Family firms are depicted as emotionally committed organizations 
characterized by intense interactions among family members within the family and the business. 
Emotional attachment and rational judgment are inseparably intertwined, thereby significantly 
affecting the strategic decision-making processes (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The essential qualities 
of family firms result in equally distinctive organizational behaviors and outcomes in which “the 
interaction of two social systems – the family and the business – enables family members to act 
simultaneously within the family and the business” in their personal and professional lives 
(Chirico & Salvato, 2008, p. 173). Miller et al. (2008) found that the family firm is, in many 
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respects, an especially salutary organizational form, repository of valuable resources and 
conducive to corporate longevity compared to a non-family firm (see also Anderson & Reeb, 
2003). 
Two major views have been constructed regarding the nature of family firms: stagnation 
vs. stewardship (Miller et al., 2008). The stewardship theory considers the family to be a source 
of competitive advantage whose uniqueness derives from the integration of family and business. 
In family firms, both family-member owners and managers view themselves as stewards of the 
family firm; their motives are aligned with the objectives of the organization which must be 
nurtured to support the future generations (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Family members are 
altruistically dedicated to the business and tend to place the business’s objectives ahead of their 
own. Such an altruistic behavior helps strengthen family relations by reducing relationship 
conflicts and fostering trust, interdependence and commitment to the family’s long term success 
(Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Miller et al. (2008) delineate the three following forms of 
stewardship in family firms: Stewardship over the continuity of business: It reflects family 
members’ strong emotional attachment to the organization (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
Stockmans, Lybaert, & Voordeckers, 2010) which contributes to an extraordinary commitment 
to proactively search for innovative strategies and exercise stewardship over the well-being and 
continuity of the firm in the long run (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Miller et al., 2008; 
Salvato et al., 2010). Stewardship over the continuity leads family firms to invest more in 
product research, market share and reputation developments compared to non-family firms. 
Stewardship over employees: It indicates the special care for the family firm and its continuity 
resulting from building “a group of talented, motivated and loyal employees” to guarantee 
family’s prosperity over time (Miller et al., 2008, p. 55). To this end, intensive training programs 
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are developed in order to coach employees to do their job well, foster the development of new 
products and acquire new knowledge (Chirico, 2008). Stewardship over customer relationships: 
It suggests that family firms are interested in “building enduring networks and associations with 
clients and other suppliers of valuable resources” (Miller et al., 2008, p. 56). This motivates 
family firms to be closer to their customers, to improve the exchange of information with them, 
and to consolidate their family trademark by directing more effort into marketing activities such 
as telemarketing and trade shows (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005).  
On the contrary, stagnation perspective depicts family firms as organizations facing the 
challenge of being undercapitalized and subject to conservatism and characterized by slow-
growing performance and short life span (Miller et al., 2008; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Lack of 
financial capital often leads to deficiency of other resources such as skilled employees. Parents 
may act altruistically towards their children, thereby hiring them despite incompetency. Thus, 
talented non-family managers may have an aversion to work in family organizations when more 
prestigious working positions are often reserved for family members (Vinton, 1998). 
Consequently, knowledge heterogeneity to promote novel and creative ideas is substantially 
reduced (Chirico & Salvato, 2008). Resource constraints may also lead to conservatism and 
induce family members to avoid crucial strategic decisions to maintain family security. As a 
result, such organizations may develop cultures that make them inflexible, resistant to change, 
and inclined to stick to path-dependent traditions that limit growth of the firm (Chirico & 
Nordqvist, 2010; Dyer, 1986). Some authors explicitly refer to a “generational shadow” - an 
enduring effect of previous strategic paths and practices on a family firm’ subsequent evolution 
(Davis & Harveston, 1999). 
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It is worthy to note and underline that Miller et al. (2008, p. 73) find support for the 
stewardship view and no confirmation whatsoever for the stagnation view, suggesting that “the 
family firm form is in many respects an especially vibrant one”. Also, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) conclude that a long-term focus gives family companies a leg up over non-family rivals.  
In the next sections, we will argue and empirically demonstrate that acquirers attribute a 
lower valuation to a family firm target compared to a non-family firm target, primarily because 
they perceive the family firm as an unprofessional organization in which stagnation motives 
prevail over stewardship motives. 
Valuing Family versus Non-Family firms in the Acquisitions Context 
The valuation of a target company is relevant to determine the price to be paid for its 
acquisition. Based on this value, the acquirer will acquire at a premium (i.e. price for a target 
firm > average price paid for comparable companies) or discount (price for a target firm < 
average price paid for comparable companies) (Koeplin et al., 2000). There are multiple 
approaches to company valuation, such as cash-flow discounting methods, income statement-
based methods, as well as rarely used balance sheet-based and goodwill-based methods 
(Benninga & Sarig, 1997; Fernández, 2002).   
Building on our previous arguments, a growing body of research suggests that family 
firms outperform non-family firms (see Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 2008; Sharma, 
2004) on a number of important indices such as market capitalization, return on assets, return on 
equity, as well as normalized compound returns (Allouche, Amann, Jaussaud & Kurashina, 
2008; Robertson, 2007). For instance, Castillo and Wakefield (2006) reported higher levels of 
company’s cash balance and return on investment (ROI) for family firms than for non-family 
firms.  
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Most previous studies have regarded family firms as solid and valuable organizational 
forms whose resources have been carefully built by family members across generations. Indeed, 
given that family firms are long-term oriented, family members in key management positions are 
induced by their strong commitment, collectivistic value, collective identity and sense of trust, 
and altruism to actively intermingle business and family resources to guarantee the continuity of 
their business with a reduced recourse to debt (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). To support their collective 
identity based on a collectivistic culture, in which each member views himself as part of “a 
larger (family or social) group [focusing on ‘we’], rather than as an isolated independent being 
[focusing on ‘I’]” (VandenBos, 2007, p. 195), family members commit to the success of their 
business. They are well-disposed towards investing ‘patient financial capital’ (Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003), they go beyond the call of duty, and exert extra efforts on behalf of their organization. For 
instance, family members are prone to make the necessary personal sacrifices and supply extra 
capital in the form of additional working hours, lower salary, free labor and use of personal 
savings to keep the business healthy across generations (c.f. survivability capital; Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003). Moreover, they invest greater resources in employee trainings, customer relationships, 
and research and development of new offerings; they give more attention to boosting the 
reputation of the business and put more emphasis on broadening the market and the share of the 
market (Miller et al., 2005; 2008).  
Interestingly, in a note to its clients in September 2007, Credit Suisse, one of the world's 
biggest investment banks from Switzerland, recommended that investors consider taking long-
term positions in companies with a significant family management influence because of their 
superior performance. Credit Suisse publicly announced that the firms in its family index had 
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outperformed their sectors by an average of 8 per cent in 2007, with a similar trend since the start 
of their research in 1996 (Robertson, 2007).  
Hence, an acquiring company whose goal is to have access to valuable complementary 
resources should positively value a potential family firm target’s resources which are carefully 
built by family members across generations. Certainly, when skilled family members – 
repository of knowledge – are retained in the acquiring company, then stewardship advantages in 
terms of family members’ values, devotion towards the business, human capital and enduring 
customer relationships persist after acquisition, thus making the family firm a genuinely valuable 
organizational form to be acquired. To this end, it becomes essential to retain at least some of the 
family members who represent repositories of specific tacit knowledge resources that may be 
difficult to imitate or acquire elsewhere (Hitt et al., 2001). For instance, based on a sample of 
147 acquisitions, Krishnan, Miller & Judge (1997, p. 371) empirically found that the lower the 
turnover among the acquired firm top management team, the better the post acquisition 
performance. They conclude that “The acquisition process is most successful when 
organizational learning occurs… Furthermore, it appears that a crucial aspect of organizational 
learning is the blending of top management teams, rather than emasculation of one or both 
teams”. 
There are basically two views that acquirers could adopt with respect to family firm 
targets: the stagnation perspective versus the stewardship perspective. Nevertheless, the term 
family firm is commonly and too often associated with concepts such as small unprofessional 
business (Gumpert & Boyd, 1984), autocratic business (Dyer, 1986), founder’s shadow (Davis & 
Harveston, 1999), nepotism (Vinton, 1998), and paternalism and family inertia (Chirico & 
Nordqvist, 2010). Indeed, a common belief is that family firms are inefficient firms, sometimes 
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perceived as ‘old-fashioned’ and boring (Buckley, 2006). They are depicted as more 
conservative than their non-family peers by operating at lower levels of innovation (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Accordingly, in the eyes of acquirers, the stagnation 
view seems to prevail over the stewardship perspective. In support of this line of thought, 
Dawson (2009) found that external investors positively value family firms only when non-family 
managers are also involved in the management of the company. Non-family managers improve 
the perceived quality of the family firm's human capital by being associated with a certain level 
of professionalism and by showing a certain degree of family members’ willingness to delegate 
authority and be open to outsiders. Moreover, external investors perceive non-family managers 
to be as professional as themselves (Dawson, 2009). The above arguments suggest the propensity 
of external parties to look at a family firm as an unprofessional and low-performing organization. 
Such negative perception is mitigated only when non-family members – perceived to be more 
professional – are active in management.  
To sum up, while the family firm is a valuable organizational form, and although most 
family firm’ advantages persist after acquisition if some of the family members are retained in 
the acquiring company (e.g. valuable resources carefully  built over generations by committed 
family members; family members’ devotion towards the business, human capital; customer 
relationships), picturing the family firm as an unprofessional and inefficient form of organization 
drives the acquiring company to underestimate the family firm’ real value and pay less (i.e. 
acquire at a discount) for it as compared to a non-family firm. In other terms, negative family 
factors, based on stagnation, prevail over positive ones, based on stewardship and thus the 
acquiring company attributes a lower valuation to a family firm target compared to a non-family 
firm target. The underlying assumption is that financial markets are inefficient (Shleifer & 
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Vishny, 2003). Acquirers do not properly analyze the advantages of potential family firm targets 
and are disposed to pay a lower price for their acquisition. Also, family firm targets have a 
weaker bargaining position compared to non-family firm targets because of the general and 
common external investors’ perception that family firms are unprofessional organizations. Thus, 
they are inclined to trade at a discount. These arguments lead us to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1:  Acquirers favor the stagnation perspective rather than the stewardship 
perspective and thus pay less (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a family firm target than 
for a non-family firm target. 
 
METHODS 
Data Collection 
To collect the data for our study, we first identified all acquisitions of medium-large 
privately-held companies belonging to the Food&Drink industry in Western Europe, on the 
Mergermarket database between 2000 and mid-2008 for which the necessary historical financial 
data were available. Privately-held companies are owned by a relatively limited number of 
shareholders and are not traded on a public stock exchange. Our privately-held company dataset 
includes both family and non-family firms. While the former have families as major owners, the 
latter are organized as cooperatives (a common organization structure for the Food&Drink 
industry), held by individual entrepreneurs, private equity and other non-publicly-listed owners.  
Some relevant information regarding our dataset is provided here. First, the choice of the 
Food&Drink industry was motivated by the following reasons. The Food&Drink industry has an 
intense consolidation activity to supply enough observations (i.e. acquisitions). The Food&Drink 
industry has also been found to include a large number of family firms, thus facilitating data 
collection (see e.g. Miller et al., 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Moreover, focusing our 
attention on a single industry enabled us to neutralize the effect of industry on our final results. 
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Second, most previous research on family firm’ performance has focused on publicly-listed 
firms, although the majority of companies worldwide are actually in private hands. Our study 
instead analyzed privately-held companies, thus focusing on the understudied segment of 
privately-held family firms involved in acquisitions. This also allowed us to avoid differences in 
valuation between privately-held and publicly-listed companies (i.e. liquidity discount) 
(Benninga & Sarig, 1997; Koeplin et al., 2000). Third, we omitted all acquisitions in which the 
target was a missing data for the enterprise value because this would have prevented us from 
calculating any of the necessary measures. Furthermore, we excluded all targets with negative 
operating profits1 (Damodaran, 2006; Liu, Nissim & Thomas, 2002). 
As mentioned before, a more conservative and accurate definition of family firm assumes 
the family to have a substantial ownership stake (51% or more of equity owned by the family) 
and at least two of its members in key management positions (Miller et al., 2007; Westhead & 
Cowling, 1998). A family firm target was defined as such in our dataset if the two conditions 
mentioned above were satisfied. In particular, at least 51% ownership stake was in the hands of 
the family and at least two family managers were involved in the business before the acquisition. 
Finally, to maintain to some extent a certain degree of family influence after the transaction, we 
tried our best to focus our attention on those acquisitions in which one or more family members 
were retained in the firm after the acquisition, thus continuing an active role in the management 
of the company. This is especially relevant in the Food&Drink industry where most of the 
product-making knowledge is tacit and resides in individuals (Makri et al., 2010).  
                                                 
1 More information is available from authors upon request 
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These selection criteria resulted in a dataset of 73 pairs of family and non-family firms. 
The sample size is comparable to previous acquisition studies based on the matched-pairs 
methodology (see e.g. Hotchkiss & Moradian, 1998; Koeplin et al., 2000). Specifically in our 
study, 59 acquirers positively answered our question of whether or not they retained one or more 
family members in the company after the acquisition.  The remaining 14 acquirers preferred 
either not to answer at all or explicitly indicated that the company was not authorized to disclose 
confidential information. Recognizing these differences, we ran the analysis first with all 73 
pairs of companies, then with the reduced dataset of 59 pairs of companies, and finally with a 
sub-dataset including only the companies in which at least two family members were retained in 
the new company. The latter is obviously the case in which family firm’ characteristics are more 
persistent after acquisition based on the stewardship perspective. Observing that results from the 
full dataset did not change significantly from that of the restricted datasets, we finally used the 
full dataset of 73 pairs of companies for our analysis. 
Given that most family firms are privately held and usually not obliged to disclose private 
information, it is extremely difficult to obtain reliable financial information on family firms. The 
dataset used in this study represents a ‘unique’ collection of data, having family firms as target 
companies and financial information regarding their valuation at the time of acquisition. Table 1 
depicts the country of origin of targets and acquirers. 36% of family firm targets and 40% of 
non-family firm targets are from the United Kingdom. The prevalence of the deals coming from 
this country can be explained by the higher propensity of UK companies to disclose financial 
data (Arruñada, 2008). 
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> 
Matched-pairs Approach 
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We adopted a matched-pairs research design in our study which allowed us to 
systematically compare family and non-family firms with a similar profile (Allouche et al., 2008; 
Westhead & Cowling, 1998). This method has already been used in previous mergers and 
acquisitions studies (Hotchkiss & Moradian, 1998; Koeplin et al., 2000) and in family-firm 
studies (Allouche et al., 2008; Miller et al., 2007).  
We established pairs of businesses (one family, one non-family) operating in the 
Food&Drink industry that matched in their size (in terms of sales and assets), geographical area, 
year of acquisition and products. Specifically, to confirm that the effect of size was neutralized 
(see Allouche et al., 2008; Koeplin et al., 2000), we performed a t-test analysis which, as 
expected, reported no significant differences between family and non-family firms in terms of 
sales (family firms: mean 123.88, median 47.18; non-family firms: mean 190.34, median 65.35; 
ns). Also, a non-significant result was obtained for assets (family firms: mean 114.00, median 
29.75, non-family firms: mean 162.15, median 31.56; ns). 
Multiples 
Multiples have been used as measures of value in this study. Penman (2004) defines 
multiple as the ratio of a market price variable (such as the stock price, the market capitalization, 
or the whole enterprise value) to a particular value driver (such as earnings, revenues, or the 
work force) of a firm. Enterprise value is defined as the value of the target company as a whole. 
It is calculated by adding together the implied equity value and the net debt of the target 
company2 (Mergermarket, 2009). Multiples are considered to be a standard technique employed 
by investment professionals. Indeed, 90% of equity research valuations and 50% of acquisition 
                                                 
2 The implied equity value is the value of the entire outstanding share capital of the target company as valued by the 
acquirer. This value always represents 100% regardless of what stake is actually being acquired. The net debt is 
equal to all interest bearing debt minus cash and cash equivalents. 
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valuations use some combination of multiples and comparable companies (Damodaran, 2002; 
Koeplin et al., 2000). In particular, multiples have been shown to result in the most accurate 
valuations when the companies are chosen on the basis of industry (Alford, 1992) as we have 
done in the present research. Multiples prove especially important for the valuation of relatively 
stable sectors such as the Food&Drink industry (Demirakos, Strong & Walker, 2004).  
To compare the mean of multiples between matched pairs of companies, the t-test 
procedure was adopted (see Allouche et al., 2008; Koeplin et al., 2000; Westhead & Cowling, 
1998). The multiples’ approach has been described by Damodaran (2006) in the following way. 
First, comparable assets that are priced by the market are found (i.e. acquisitions of comparable 
companies). Second, enterprise values that emerge from the market prices are scaled to a 
common variable to generate standardized prices for comparability (i.e. the enterprise value is 
divided by a relevant accounting measure). Third, standardized values are adjusted for 
differences across companies (e.g. industry, size, country, year and so forth).  
EBIT and EBITDA Multiples 
Despite the extensive use of multiples in valuation, there is no consensus on the use of 
any particular multiple (Lie & Lie, 2002). In our study, we specifically used two multiples that 
are often applied in mergers and acquisitions analysis: EBIT multiple (i.e. Enterprise 
Value/EBIT) and EBIDTA multiple (i.e. Enterprise Value/EBIDTA) (see e.g. Hotchkiss & 
Moradian, 1998; Koeplin et al., 2000). In fact, when the acquisition involves the whole business 
(versus just the equity in the business), it is recommended to examine the value of the firm as a 
multiple of the EBIT and/or the EBITDA (Damodaran, 2006).  They are two valuable measures 
of a firm’s cash flow, based on two different measures of earnings: Earnings Before Interest and 
Taxes (EBIT) and Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization of intangibles 
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(EBITDA). These two measures were selected rather than after-tax earnings because the values 
of EBIT and EBITDA are both independent of the capital structures (i.e. the mix of debt and 
equity) of the acquired companies. In contrast, the earnings (i.e. profits after tax) figure reflects 
the capital structure of the company because earnings are computed after interest expenses and 
taxes. Hence, two companies with identical profit streams may have different net earnings ratios 
due to differences in their capital structures. Thus, it is more appropriate to use a multiple based 
on earnings before interest and taxes to compensate for the differing capital structures of the two 
firms. Both EBIT and EBITDA provide a measure of company cash flows available to service 
debt and pay dividends. The difference between the two is that EBIT is computed net of 
depreciation, which is a non-cash expense, whereas EBITDA adds back depreciation 
(Damodaran, 2006; Koeplin et al., 2000).  
Additionally, EBIDTA is the most frequently used multiple and is considered the most 
appropriate measure to value a company. Indeed, it is often used in company reports and 
brokers’ calculations in both Europe and the US. For instance, Kim and Ritter (1999) used 
several multiples for the valuation of initial public offering matching companies (i.e. P/E, market 
value to book value, price to sales, enterprise value to sales, and enterprise value to EBITDA). 
However, they found that the EBITDA multiple resulted in the most precise valuation. 
Interestingly, Lie and Lie (2002) have also demonstrated that the EBIDTA multiple should be 
preferred even to EBIT, because depreciation expenses distort the information value of earnings. 
Moreover, EBITDA multiple is a more suitable measure in mature industries such as the Food & 
Drink industry (Fernàndez, 2001). 
Following the method used by Koeplin et al. (2000), the family firm discount or premium 
in this study was estimated, as follows: 
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Family firm Discount = 1 – (Family firm Multiple / Non-Family firm Multiple)3 
RESULTS  
The descriptive statistics and correlations of the study’s variables are presented in Table 
2.  The family firm discount or premium is shown in Table 3. The EBIT multiple produced a 
statistically non-significant result. But, when examining the EBIDTA multiple that is the most 
appropriate measure to value a firm, our findings indicate that family firm’ multiples are lower 
than those for non-family firms. Specifically, external investors acquire family firm targets at a 
moderately statistically significant discount relative to comparable non-family firm targets 
(discount mean: 16%; discount median: 5%; p<.10). That is, non-family firms are valued higher 
relative to comparable family firms. Hence, for two comparable businesses (one family, one non-
family) with the same EBITDA figure, buyers would pay less (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a 
family firm than for a comparable non-family firm, thus confirming our hypothesis (see Table 3).  
<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
However, given the difference in results obtained with EBIT and EBIDTA multiples, as 
mentioned before, it is important to underline that EBITDA multiple is preferred over the EBIT 
multiple in the academic and practitioner communities (see e.g. Fernàndez, 2001; Lie & Lie, 
2002) The practical importance of the EBIDTA multiple is further confirmed by the existence of 
an index provided by Argos Soditic & Epsilon Research that measures the evolution of European 
private mid-market company prices via EV/EBITDA multiple (Argos Soditic, 2010). The index 
provider explains: “We think this multiple [EBITDA multiple] is the most suitable for a 
                                                 
3 A negative family firm discount reflects a family firm premium. 
 
20 
 
European index as it is not impacted by the target’s financial structure nor by its policies 
regarding depreciation and provisioning (which vary in time and between countries). It is also 
the closest readily available proxy for operating cash flow”. (Argos Soditic, 2010, p. 3) 
As concerns our dataset, to further confirm the accuracy of the EBIDTA multiple over 
the EBIT multiple, and the statistical significance of our result, we compared the coefficients of 
variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) of the two multiples. EBIDTA multiple 
appears to have a much lower value of this coefficient (see Table 4). This indicates that there was 
more consensus about the value of EBIDTA multiple than about the EBIT multiple in 
acquisitions included in our dataset. 
<<Insert Table 4 about here>> 
Additionally, it is worthy to note that by running the analysis first with all 73 pairs of 
companies, and then with the reduced datasets (see data collection), results did not change 
substantially. If there is no observable difference in the result when  zero, one, or more than one 
family member are retained in the firm after the acquisition, then retaining family members does 
not bring any advantage from the acquirers’ point of view. If the acquirers value family firms at a 
discount even if they retain family members (as it is in 59 acquirers out of 73), it indicates that 
they do not appreciate the family firm’ advantages that can be transferred by the retained family 
members. This further supports our hypothesis4. Finally, to make sure that our result did not 
reflect poorer performance of family firm targets, we also ran a t-test to compare the EBITDA 
and EBIT margins (i.e. EBITDA/Sales and EBIT/Sales) between family and non-family firm 
targets. The differences in the margins’ means were not statistically significant (EBITDA/Sales: 
Family 13.73%, Non-family 13.94%, ns; EBIT/Sales: Family 9.22%, Non-family 9.16%, ns), 
                                                 
4 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insightful comment. 
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thus allowing us to conclude that family and non-family firms have the same levels of 
performance as measured by margins (see Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996). 
DISCUSSION  
In the present study we explored the overlooked topic of valuing family firms in the 
context of acquisitions. Specifically, our objective was to shed light on the valuation of family 
firm targets compared to non-family firm targets. Previous studies confirmed that family firms 
outperform non-family firms, thus suggesting that the stewardship perspective prevails over the 
stagnation perspective (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 2008). Yet, our results 
showed that in the eyes of external investors, stagnation disadvantages prevail over stewardship 
advantages because they perceive the family firm as an unprofessional and inefficient 
organization, thus negatively affecting its valuation compared to a similar non-family firm target. 
Accordingly, when examining the EBIDTA multiple our empirical analysis confirmed our 
hypothesis that acquirers pay less (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a family firm target than for a 
non-family firm target. Also, although the EBIT multiple produced a statistically non-significant 
result, it offers some interesting insights. Indeed, it appears that EBIT of both family and non-
family firms are valued similarly (Koeplin et al., 2000) which implies that acquires fail to 
discriminate between family and non-family firm targets. In light of this result, we may speculate 
that acquiring companies are unable to recognize the advantages associated with a family firm 
target compared to a non-family firm target.  
Contributions 
Some contributions emerge from our study. First, the present research contributes to 
filling the gap in the family firm literature regarding the study of valuation of privately-held 
family firm targets in the acquisitions context. Our study indeed represents the first empirical 
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research to shed light on the valuation of family firm targets compared to non-family firm 
targets, showing through the EBIDTA multiple that acquiring companies pay a lower price for a 
family firm target. 
Second, the academic and business communities have often encouraged family-firm 
scholars to rely more on a matched-pairs methodology to develop comparable analysis between 
family and non-family firms (Westhead & Cowling, 1998). We adopt this method in our study 
and use two well-known and commonly used multiples (i.e. EBIT and EBIDTA multiples) that 
have not been employed in family firm studies to date. Further, following the study of Westhead 
& Cowling (1998, p. 33), adoption of the matched-pairs methodology enabled us to discover 
“real” differences rather than “sample” differences between family and non-family firm targets. 
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, the dataset used in this study represents a ‘unique’ 
collection of data; it comprises of family firms as target companies, and, despite the difficulty in 
obtaining financial information for family firms, contains a set of family firms whose financial 
information at the time of acquisition was disclosed. 
Limitations 
Several limitations should also be noted. We argue that a family firm is a more solid 
organization compared to a non-family firm given that family members invest greater resources 
in employees’ training, customer relationships, research and development, and company 
reputation (Miller et al., 2005; 2008). However, although we did our best to ensure that the data 
reflected a certain degree of family influence after the transaction (see methods), our data did not 
allow us to fully investigate whether family firm’ characteristics are effectively persistent after 
acquisition. The present gap needs to be addressed in future studies on acquisitions and 
valuations of family firms. Although we are aware of the difficulty in achieving this goal, 
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building a larger dataset including family firm targets in which multiple family member 
managers are retained in the active management of the acquiring company, will help in this 
direction. In such case, post acquisition performance when the target company is a family firm 
versus a non-family firm should also be examined. 
Further, given the data limitation, we were unable to match our companies for earnings 
growth5. However, Alford (1992, p. 107) obtained evidence that, if controlled for industry type, 
additionally controlling for earnings growth in the analysis does not reduce valuation errors. In 
other words, “industry appears to be a good surrogate for the component of…earnings growth 
related to multiples”. 
Finally, the generalization of our findings remains limited to the specific industry and 
geographical areas on which our dataset was built. 
Research Implications 
The present article may be regarded as a point of departure for guiding and pushing 
forward further research. First, given that acquisitions are an important part of the business 
process of redeploying resources into more productive uses, more research should be directed to 
how family firm’ resources can be effectively integrated into the acquiring company, and 
whether the process may be facilitated when the acquirer is also a family firm (Feito-Ruiz & 
Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester, 2010). Recent studies argue that 
within an inter-firm cooperation, when both parties involved are family firms, similarity in the 
family status provides a contextual understanding (Chirico, Ireland & Sirmon, 2010). Both 
parties benefit from complementary resources, shared levels of commitment and similar 
                                                 
5 We were able to collect information on earnings growth only for 47 observations for family firms and 37 for non-
family firms. As expected, after performing the t-test, the mean growth rates of family and non-family firms resulted 
to be statistically insignificant. 
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appreciation of socioemotional wealth, thus leading to a competitive advantage (Stockmans et 
al., 2010). Hence, family-firm acquirers could be more willing to pay a premium for family-firm 
targets, as they may be better suited to leveraging synergies based on family-specific common 
resources6. 
Second, although most previous studies confirm that family firms perform better than 
non-family firms, we admit that this may appear somewhat unrealistic and not general to all 
family organizations that are heterogeneous entities. Future studies should detail to what extent 
such a superior performance of family firms exists, especially when acquirers need to evaluate 
potential family versus non-family firm targets. Following the same line of thought, several 
questions require further exploration. For instance, is it enough that a family firm is a solid 
organization at the time of acquisition for acquirers to pay a premium compared to comparable 
non-family firms? To what extent and under what conditions do idiosyncratic family 
characteristics persist after acquisition? And, even though Miller et al. (2008) did not find 
support for the stagnation perspective, do the possible negative aspects of a family firm 
underlined by the stagnation perspective, such as conservatism and nepotism, disappear once the 
family firm is acquired in the new company? Future research clearly needs to be channeled in 
these directions. 
Third, with few exceptions (see Miller et al., 2008), most of the empirical results on 
which we base our theoretical section stem from the analysis of large and public firms. On the 
contrary, although our dataset is composed of medium-large companies, these companies are 
privately-held. Future studies may replicate our work on a dataset of public companies and find 
out whether results would change for public organizations. 
                                                 
6 We thank the editors for this helpful comment. 
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Fourth, accounting measures of value may be also a possible line for future research. For 
example, scholars may further explore whether difference in multiples we found can be also 
attributed to differences in accounting practices in family versus non-family firms (Cascino, 
Pugliese, Mussolino, & Sansone, 2010; Yang, 2010).  
Finally, scholars may take into consideration the quantity of transferred shares so as to 
account for control discount effect. For instance, the control discount effect would be lower if 
transferred shareholding interest is about 51%, and higher if it is about 100%7.   
Practical Implications 
This research has several practical implications. For the acquirers, we show that family 
firm targets are undervalued relative to comparable non-family firm peers (see EBIDTA 
multiple’s result). We argue that their ‘real’ value is not recognized by the acquirers. The typical 
due diligence processes in mergers and acquisitions commonly focus on financial health and 
rarely extend beyond to identify special knowledge stocks held by targets. Consequently, if 
family firm’ idiosyncratic family knowledge or other positive characteristics prove significant in 
a specific target, this may provide a unique investment opportunity for acquiring companies. 
Instead, the acquirer tends to underestimate the family firm target’s value and is inclined to pay 
less for a business whose value may be in fact higher, and thus risks losing valuable investment 
opportunities when the family-firm target is averse to selling at a lower price.  
Acquirers also need to understand that a part of target company’s managers should be 
retained in the acquiring company, especially when the target company is a family firm with 
members who possess idiosyncratic knowledge and values that are hard to imitate or acquire 
elsewhere (Chirico, 2008; Chirico & Salvato, 2008; Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010). The key is to 
                                                 
7 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insightful comment. 
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find target firms with complementary human capital (i.e. knowledge stocks) that remains and 
becomes part of the main company. In doing so, the process of recombining existing resources 
with external resources gained via acquisition can be quicker and easier after the acquisition.  
For family firm owners, we showed that their firms are likely to be assigned a lower 
value than they are worth. The negative consequence for the family firm target is evident: it gets 
less money than it is worth. Hence, family firm targets need to send positive signals to their 
acquirers to mitigate the general negative perception that the potential acquirers may have 
regarding the family organization form. They need to explicitly prove the solidness of their firm, 
given that such firm was built and managed to last long. Instead, family firms are commonly 
characterized by a low level of transparency and managed with a “veil of secrecy” (Castillo & 
Wakefield, 2006, p.49). Moreover, family firm targets need to persuade acquirers that their 
advantages will persist. This goal may be achieved for instance by retaining multiple 
knowledgeable family managers in the company, by having in place long-term customer 
contracts, by agreeing to accept a part of acquisition payment upon reaching some milestone 
(e.g. revenue target), or by quantifying and reporting intangible family-based resources to third 
parties, and so forth. 
In conclusion, we hope that this research informs, extends and encourages future work on 
family firms’ acquisitions and suggests changes in the managerial way of thinking when a family 
firm target is involved in the acquisition process.  
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Table 1. Country of Origin of Targets and Acquirers 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
  Mean Std. dev 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Assets 138.45 347.02 1     
2. Sales 157.11 314.41 .832** 1    
3. EBITDA 21.34 63.43 .910** .872** 1   
4. EBIT 14.76 46.2 .882** .841** .988** 1  
5. Family dummy .5 .5 -.07 -.11 -.1 -.09 1 
** p <.01; N. 146 
Values expressed in USD million (Assets, Sales, EBITDA, EBIT) 
 
Table 3. Family Firm Discount/Premium 
  
Family firms Non-family firms Discount 
Sig. 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
EBIT multiple 34.82 16.15 30.58 15.16 -14% -7% ns 
EBITDA multiple 11.28 9.78 13.39 10.33 16% 5% * 
*: p<.10 
ns: Not statistically significant. 
  
 
Table 4. Coefficient of Variation of the Multiples 
 
 
Country Family Non-family 
Target Acquirer Target Acquirer
     Americas N/A 3 N/A 4 
     BeNeLux 7 8 3 3 
     France 8 6 13 8 
     Germany 2 2 1 0 
     Italy 10 4 6 3 
    Spain 8 9 9 11 
    UK 26 24 29 27 
    Nordic Countries 8 8 6 7 
    Others 4 9 6 9 
    Unknown 0 0 0 1 
 
EBIT 
Multiple 
EBITDA 
Multiple 
Family firms 3.12 .52 
Non-family firms 1.47 .68 
All firms 2.52 .62 
